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Disputes: A comparative analysis of  
the Soeharto and the post-Soeharto era 
 
 
Derry Aplianta   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
Before it developed into a dispute among China and Southeast Asian nations, the South 
China Sea has been disputed long before it became what it is today. The post-World War II 
era brought a fresh start to a new chapter of dispute, as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam laid their claims one by one. This study 
contends that under Suharto’s iron fist rule, Indonesia’s interest to the South China Sea 
dispute grew from maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity to maintaining domestic 
stability. The former took shape after being threatened by China’s map which claimed a part 
of the former’s territorial waters, while the later grew in through establishing deeper trade 
cooperation with China. Despite the half-hearted normalization with China, Indonesia 
managed to establish a track-two forum for parties involved in the South China Sea dispute, 
which is later proven to be instrumental. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia gradually 
played its initial role from a passive into an active honest broker, which brought 
improvements to the process. This research attempts to show that constraint to Indonesia’s 
role in the South China Sea dispute originates from both the ideological and historical factors. 
Indonesia’s long-running ideological constraints set its priorities to its interest to the dispute, 
while its foreign policy doctrine serves as a pragmatic means to achieve its goals of interests. 
Indonesia’s past relationship with China also played a part in influencing Indonesia’s 
response which later evolved as the relations went through ups and downs. Moreover, the 
unclear integration process of ASEAN sets the task of the honest broker became a one-
country-show for Indonesia. 
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Introduction 
 
The South China Sea (SCS) dispute 
ensued as a result of inter-overlapping 
territorial claims from Brunei Darussalam, 
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam. Although the dispute may 
have developed into a complex 
phenomenon of what it is today, it actually 
started as a result of an even more complex 
2 
 
Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes 
 
occurring which directly or indirectly 
involved a lot more states. Simply put, the 
dispute is a situation which serves as an 
outcome of an ongoing interaction among 
the entities in perceiving their territories. 
Although it may give less weight from the 
international legal perspective, we may 
trace the beginning of the dispute through 
extensive chronological review of any 
recorded activities in the SCS, dating from 
as early as the ancient times to give a better 
understanding of the situation which lead 
to the one we currently see today. Another 
way to trace the origins of the dispute is to 
selectively present the historical records 
which suggest that there were any 
indication of dispute among two or more 
parties to the area. This study investigates 
reaction of the Indonesian government and 
what may cause that reaction since the 
authoritarian Soeharto until the democratic 
regime of Susilo B. Yudhoyono. This study 
found that Indonesia’s response to SCS 
dispute during the New Order Era grew 
from maintaining over territorial integrity 
to actively accommodate peaceful talks 
between claimant countries in the reform 
era which might reflect Indonesia’s growing 
interests of the dispute itself or parties to 
the dispute. It was steadily developing from 
a simpler honest broker role into an active 
bridge builder, and ultimately holds 
ASEAN’s leadership in preserving inter-
regional peace and stability. 
This article will discuss the issue in 
two consecutive sections: the New Order 
era and the Reform era. The following 
section discusses and analyzes Indonesia’s 
response to the SCS dispute during the 
Suharto era and how the archipelagic 
country conveyed its interests into policies 
to maintain the dispute. Next, it will discuss 
Indonesia’s foreign policy during the 
reform and democratic era, and how the 
transformation alluded Indonesia’s foreign 
policy with the country’s ongoing response 
to the SCS dispute in particular.  
 
Indonesia’s Response to the South China 
Sea Dispute during Suharto’s Period 
 
Indonesia and the Normalization of the 
Diplomatic Relations with China 
 
Suharto’s reign to power marks the 
era called the ‚New Order‛ for Indonesia. 
The dichotomy was created to serve as a 
distinction from the era where Sukarno 
ruled Indonesia for more than two decades, 
which is dubbed as ‚Old Order‛. This 
means aside from Suharto as the new head 
of state, the ‚new‛ terminology also 
brought new faces in Indonesian socio-
political life, which in turn brought 
Indonesia to a new style of leadership. The 
leadership, where Suharto remained in the 
center, was an alliance of the armed forces, 
intellectuals, religious groups, and political 
parties, under the political system known as 
the Pancasila Democracy. By utilizing such 
a system that knows no opposition, Suharto 
had the complete control of Indonesia’s 
domestic and foreign policies. 
During Suharto’s rule from 1968 
until 1998, the foreign policy of Indonesia 
claimed the neutral posture of free and 
active principal inherited from the previous 
reign. In practice, Suharto’s foreign policy 
was stealthily sided with the western bloc 
as an attempt to distance Indonesia from the 
communist world and while gaining 
financial and technical assistance from the 
Western Bloc. New Order Indonesia’s 
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economy was engineered by the western-
centric economists, while the country’s 
defense assets were geared by arms 
imported from NATO countries. This Post-
Sukarno Indonesia also foresaw the 
founding of ASEAN with Southeast Asian 
countries and the suspension of diplomatic 
relations with communist China. 
The SCS dispute was initially not of 
Indonesia’s concern since the focus of 
Suharto was building Indonesia’s economy 
which was torn by inflation in the mid-
1960s, however at a certain point Indonesia 
decided to involve itself to the dispute as a 
response.  
In the beginning, Indonesia did not 
put much interest in international issues. 
Like most developing countries in the 
world, the focus of Indonesia under Suharto 
was to rebuild the country’s economy 
which was collapsed under Sukarno’s 
administration which suffered massive 
hyper-inflation (Panglaykim & Thomas, 
1967). Since economic recovery was the 
main focus of the country, Suharto set up 
his men to formulate and carry out 
initiatives with the aim to recover 
Indonesia’s economy. As a result, during 
the beginning of Suharto’s tenure 
Indonesia’s foreign policy was aimed at 
achieving national economic recovery. 
Suharto’s plan to rebuild the economy was 
carried out with the reinvigoration of the 
gear of production by inviting investments 
and capitals to Indonesia. For such cause, 
Suharto and his men began a tour with a 
mission to promote and introducing new 
investment law in Indonesia to countries 
such as West Germany and Japan. The 
effort showed progress; in the initial phase 
Indonesia successfully attracted foreign 
enterprises to establish production and 
extraction facilities to mine the country’s 
abundant natural resources with notable 
few including Freeport-McMoran and 
International Nickel Company (Pease, 
1996). 
 
To ensure the process going well as well as 
to ensure Suharto’s regime enjoyed 
sustainable benefits from it, the new regime 
sought political stability. In fact, Suharto’s 
leadership was well known for its high 
regard for stability. His quest for 
Indonesia’s development required incessant 
political sustenance and social order, which 
in turn shaped Indonesia as an inward-
looking country for at least two-thirds of 
New Order era. Suharto’s foremost concern 
for the stability to support Indonesia’s 
development transformed Indonesia into a 
pseudo-democratic country where political 
aspirations were limited and dissents 
within the society were suppressed. During 
his three decades of rule, Suharto 
successfully created and instilled a stable 
political culture, whiles his legacy has 
shown as a prominent yet inspiring figure 
for the leaders of neighboring countries, 
namely Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia 
and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (Woolcot, 
2008). 
New Order brought growth and 
development to Indonesia, thus earned 
Suharto’s famous nickname of ‚Indonesia’s 
Father of Development‛ in the 1980s. With 
Indonesia economy’s flourished, it became 
inevitable that Indonesia had to expand its 
growth through International trade and 
investments to sustain its growing 
economy, especially when the world saw 
the Oil Crash in 1980s. During that period, 
Suharto was trying to increase non-oil 
exports to be more competitive since the 
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country saw a decrease of revenue in oil 
sales (Indonesia Oil – exports, 2013). Apart 
from making the non-oil exports more 
attractive, it was also logical to approach 
inaccessible markets to increase potential 
revenues. These underlying conditions then 
led to the re-opening trade relations of 
Indonesia with China, which consequently 
paved the way to diplomatic normalization 
between the two countries. 
The normalization of the diplomatic 
relation between Indonesia and China was 
seemingly something that China had been 
eagerly seeking. Indeed, Indonesia 
maintained the gesture of the proposed side 
of the offer, hinting that it was the Chinese 
Government who wished to rekindle the 
bilateral relations (van der Kroef, 1986). As 
reluctant as it seem for Indonesia to 
normalize its bilateral relationship with 
China, the archipelagic country needs to 
sustain its economic growth through the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations 
(Sukma, 2013). If the political stability of 
domestic was the one that ensured and 
sustained Indonesia’s economic 
development of most of the time during 
Suharto’s rule, the late 1980s saw the need 
of Indonesia to sustain the stability through 
a wider economic activity (Sukma, 2013). 
Indonesia and China’s first post-
Sukarno’s official meeting was in 1985 
Asian-African Conference in Bandung, 
Indonesia. This meeting of Suharto and the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja with Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wu Xueqian resulted in an 
immediate progress of the two countries 
which came into motion with the 
normalization of the trade relations in the 
same year (Indonesia, China, to Normalize, 
1989). However, the talks of resuming 
diplomatic relations did not happen until 
1989 (van der Kroef, 1986), when President 
Suharto attended the funeral of the late 
Emperor Hirohito in Tokyo. During the 
visit Suharto met Chinese Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen who was also attending the 
funeral under his capacity as a statesman. 
Their rendezvous inevitably led to the 
further conversation of normalization of 
diplomatic relations of the two countries 
year (Indonesia, China, to Normalize, 1989). 
As mentioned earlier, Indonesia displayed 
reluctance to push the normalization 
agenda for the process require a lot of time 
and preparation, but it was trade, as it was 
Indonesia’s main interest that was pushed 
forward into realization almost 
immediately. The resumption of the trade 
relations between the two countries might 
serve as Beijing’s gambit to appease Suharto 
who was so adamant in creating an 
Indonesia free from Chinese influence for 
almost 20 years (van der Kroef, 1986). 
Aside from maintaining the current 
socio-political status quo, Indonesia’s 
reluctance to carry out the normalization 
with China was partly caused by 
ideological reasons. Indonesia sought 
China’s word on not to support any 
communism causes in Indonesia. Foreign 
Minister Kusumaatmadja reiterated 
Indonesia’s prerequisite conditions to 
China, as not to offer any kinds of support 
to anything that opposes the legal 
Government of Indonesia. Formally, this 
was interpreted as an acknowledgement 
of sovereignty from one country to another, 
a normative procedure in international 
relations. On the other side, this could also 
be interpreted as an official request from 
Indonesia to China, not to do anything that 
could harm the current regime. This 
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confirmed that Indonesia might still bear 
suspicions to China. Although China’s 
allegation of involvement in the 1965 
attempted coup is still debatable, Suharto 
has made it clear that to resume diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia; China needs to 
abide by Indonesia’s terms, something 
which China eventually acceded to despite 
ideological incoherencies between the 
Chinese Communist Party’s ideology and 
the terms (van der Kroef, 1986). 
Nevertheless, the diplomatic 
normalization agenda was already set in 
motion. After the initial encounter in 1985, 
the process was filled with the exchanging 
visits of Indonesian high officials to their 
Chinese counterparts. For the second time, 
Suharto met Qian Qichen when the Foreign 
Minister made an official visit to the 
President in Jakarta. As a response, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
visited China later in 1990.Alatas’ visit to 
Beijing produced a communiqué of the 
resumption of Indonesia – China’s 
diplomatic relations, which was then 
followed with Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 
visit to Indonesia then formalized with the 
signing of Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations. 
Indonesia and China have officially 
reestablished their diplomatic relations in 
1990. 
 
Suharto’s Indonesia and Its Initial 
Response to the South China Sea Dispute 
 
Despite its non-claimant status, 
Indonesia has been aware of the SCS 
dispute as the clash of claims is situated in 
close proximity to its territorial waters. The 
earliest Indonesia’s expressed concern of 
SCS dispute ever documented was in 1980, 
when diplomatic relations with China was 
still frozen. At that point Indonesia’s 
Military Commander, M. Yusuf commented 
that there is a possibility of war in the SCS. 
Indonesia responded to the SCS dispute in a 
traditional fashion: by the deployment of 
military might in the disputed border as it 
then deployed 35 battalions for military 
exercise within waters surrounding the 
Natuna islands. It is worth noted that 
Indonesia’s response to the dispute was 
arguably because Indonesia was more 
concerned to its own domestic security, 
especially border and territorial issues 
which had the potential for disintegration in 
particular. 
Indonesia’s involvement in 
international disputes was not new to 
Suharto’s Indonesia. The country has sent 
troops known as Garuda Contingents for 
Peace Keeping Operations in a number of 
Southeast Asian countries. From more than 
68 missions taken by the Garudas, Suharto’s 
administration had their share of at least 40 
missions. It is worth noting that until the 
1990s most of the contingents for 
peacekeeping operations were deployed to 
Middle Eastern countries, while contingents 
to neighboring countries such as Cambodia 
and the Philippines were sent after 1991. As 
conjecture it may be, these deployments of 
contingents showed Indonesia’s grown 
interest and awareness in maintaining the 
stability of the Southeast Asian region, or in 
other words Indonesia began to see the 
regional instabilities as threat to its national 
interest. But it is also important to point out 
that Indonesia’s involvement with the 
Garuda Contingents is nothing as similar as 
the country’s involvement in the SCS 
dispute where Indonesia plays the role of 
the honest broker for Southeast Asian 
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countries and the diplomatically 
reestablished China. 
 
After the successful normalization with 
Indonesia has taken place, China swiftly 
mingle itself with the Southeast Asian 
community under the ASEAN. China 
became an official dialogue partner for 
ASEAN after Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and State Councilor Qian Qichen attended 
the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. This turn of 
events brought a new air to Southeast Asia 
as this enabled both China and ASEAN 
member countries to establish dialogue 
which was previously hampered by the 
tensions of Cold War. Unfortunately, 
China’s inclusion to ASEAN’s forum did 
not suppress the dispute from becoming a 
stumbling block. 
Aware of the brewing situation in 
the SCS, it was in 1991 Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas warned that the regional dispute 
could be developing into a conflict 
(Johnson, 1997). Amidst Indonesia’s 
neutrality in the dispute, the country 
expressed concerns regarding the situation 
in SCS which involved its Southeast Asian 
neighbors. This indicated that Suharto’s 
administration recognized the SCS dispute 
as a concern to Indonesia. But what kind of 
threat did this dispute possess to Indonesia? 
After all, the claims made by Brunei, China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam were 
revolving an area distant in proximity to 
Indonesia. None of the islands claimed were 
actually owned by Indonesia, so how this 
dispute did actually equate to Indonesia’s 
interest? Indonesia’s interest to the SCS is 
not a single unitary factor. The archipelagic 
country’s interest can be interpreted into 
multiple factors. The first one might be 
related to the immediate interest of the 
country, which is its own territorial 
integrity. 
According to Satyawan, Indonesia’s 
national interests in the SCS are security 
and territorial integrity, economic interest, 
constitution mandate and ASEAN unity 
(Satyawan, 2013). During a stage of 
Suharto’s administration, Indonesia shifted 
the course which seemed irregular to the 
regime’s resolve to focus on national 
stability. This shift was demonstrated by 
Indonesia’s involvement in international 
issues such as the SCS dispute. In 1993 
China laid out the 9 dashed lines map and 
integrated it effectively as part of its 
national law, which covers the entire South 
China Sea area, including the areas which 
the Southeast Asian countries claimed as 
theirs, and as expected, this course of action 
was then responded negatively from the 
claimant countries. At that time, Indonesia 
as a country which held their principles 
with a rigorous fashion under Suharto’s 
stern leadership, might have felt threatened 
by China’s unilateral actions. It has been 
only a few years after the diplomatic 
relations between Indonesia and China was 
normalized, and seeds of wariness and 
uneasiness against communism were still 
deep-planted within Indonesia’s 
indoctrinated society, while ethnic Chinese 
were precariously treated as the second 
class buffer citizens by Suharto’s regime 
design. Indonesia in general was apparently 
threatened, as they were the main target of 
suspiciousness if there was any indication 
of disadvantageous scheme from China 
which will hurt Indonesia (Sukma, 1999). 
Should any disruptions occur, this will 
surely bring an impact to Indonesia’s 
stability and ultimately security. 
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Figure 1.  The Nine-dotted line map 
 
 
Source: Asia Maps, The University of Texas 
 
 
The other factor to Indonesia’s 
interests is economy. The immediate threat 
to the region was caused by the nature of 
the dashed lines map, which included 
Indonesia’s northwestern territory, the seas 
of Natuna. The Natuna islands area, which 
is rich with gas and minerals, is one of 
Indonesia’s biggest energy assets which 
supply the country with abundant gas 
reserves and revenues from gas exports 
(Azwar, 2013). The effect of losing such 
valuable territory would not only caused 
Indonesia to suffer a major loss of potential 
revenues and gas reserve, but also 
something which generate an immense 
disadvantage to Indonesia’s strategic policy. 
The SCS issue is a multifaceted 
phenomenon to Indonesia, as it does not 
concern only a single tangible aspect. In a 
strategic perspective, the logic of the SCS 
dispute would suggest that should the 
Southeast Asian countries lost their claimed 
territories to China, then the risk of 
territorial loss for Indonesia is amplified. 
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This logic is based on the domino effect and 
spillover effect, but rather than ideological 
or economical the argument is based on 
historical jurisprudence from the legal 
perspective. Historical jurisprudence refers 
to a legal approach which considers the past 
legal method in resolving an issue as the 
evidence and legal method are used as the 
benchmark for resolving a similar case. 
Should the claimant Southeast Asian 
countries lose their claimed territories to 
China through international legal 
procedures; it would possess a threat to 
Indonesia’s legal authority over the 
Natunas’ waters.  
Another reason as to why Indonesia 
refused to not taking any direct action is 
Suharto’s high regard for stability. As a 
country which has enjoyed stability for 
more than three decades, Indonesia was in 
the midst of developing itself into one of 
Asia’s emerging economic powers, or 
commonly known as one of the ‚Tigers of 
Asia‛. Indonesia’s diplomatic normalization 
with China was intended to sustain the 
domestic development of Indonesia which 
was considered to be on the verge of 
‚tinggal landas‛ or literally defined as 
transitioning into a developed country 
(Harian Ekonomi Neraca, 2013). To 
associate itself among the newly emerging 
developing countries, Indonesia felt the 
need to secure the stability of the region 
through diminishing potential threats 
which might arise in the coming periods. 
Indonesia’s past hostility with China could 
be an even greater threat whereas the 
diplomatic absence was to be kept 
suspended while the country’s immense 
power continues to grow. Although it is 
unclear whether the normalization of the 
diplomatic relation was also factored by the 
growing dispute in the SCS, it is safe to 
assume that Indonesia sought reassurance 
of stability from its foreign policies by 
neutralizing the amount of potential threat 
the Southeast Asian region could bring to 
the country. 
 
Indonesia’s Response to SCS Dispute: Track 
II Diplomacy, Shuttle Diplomacy, and 
Defensive Posture Response 
 
As the opinion of two institutions 
were divided: the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (Deplu) which leaned to the 
accommodation and diplomatic approach to 
engage China; the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(ABRI) that preferred to terminate and sever 
diplomatic relations with China, the 
Government of Indonesia maintained a 
balance of the soft and hard approach to 
manage the dispute. Since Indonesia was 
reluctant to do a direct approach and 
mediate the dispute G-to-G, Deplu 
sponsored a series of workshops which 
facilitated talks and dialogues between 
stakeholders of the issue. 
The workshop mechanism was 
intended to de-escalate the atmosphere 
which was tense from the previous stand-
offs. Another purpose of the workshop was 
also to strengthen and consolidate the 
ASEAN unity among member states, 
namely the Philippines and Malaysia, as the 
two countries not only clashed with China 
on the claimed territories, but also with 
each other. The other purpose was to bring 
non-member states to the dispute such as 
Taiwan to sit together with China and 
discuss the issue among each other. 
Indonesia deliberately constructed an 
informal workshop format so that the 
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respective delegates can attend and 
participate with ease. Participants should 
feel safer to engage in dialogues and 
exchanging views with each other since 
everyone attending is within their 
respective personal capacities. If the realist 
perspective perceives the security dilemma 
and perception of threat as something 
generated from the lack of communication 
among states, then the workshop would 
serve as the bridge which would close the 
gap of information and miscommunication, 
thus foster further understanding and 
cooperation. 
As it was intended, ASEAN member 
countries and claimant countries were the 
ones who participated in this informal 
forum. These countries served as the main 
‚pillars‛ of the workshop and addressed as 
Supporting Regional Authorities (SRAs). 
The attendees of the workshop were 
basically divided into four classifications: 
the first one being the participants, who was 
appointed by the SRAs to attend under their 
private capacities. These participants were 
from various institutions such as the foreign 
affairs department/ministry, academicians, 
and representatives of private companies. 
The second category of the attendee was the 
observers. Similar to the participants’ 
category, the observers consisted of 
participants that consisted of academicians 
and researchers, with the additions of non-
diplomatic government officials, military 
officers, journalists, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) members. The third 
attendee category was the resource persons. 
The individuals belonged in this category 
were appointed by the committee to 
provide the workshop with their work and 
expertise, most of the times to provide 
points of discussions. While the last 
category of attendee was the committee 
members, mostly consisted of the 
individuals from the foreign affairs 
departments/ministries. 
With de-escalation as one of the 
workshop’s main concerns, the committee 
set the condition to be more conducive for 
discussions. For example, to avoid 
confrontations among the participants, the 
committee set the agenda of the workshop 
to avoid issues which are too sensitive to 
discuss. Most the time the highlight of the 
discussions revolves around establishing 
new methods of cooperation between 
countries in less-political fields such as 
environmental protection, navigational 
safety, and scientific research (Djalal, 2001). 
In line with the ASEAN way, 
recommendations and conclusions of the 
workshops were agreed upon based on 
consensus and not formally enforced. 
Should a participant disagree to a point of 
discussion, it should hold the discussion 
from having a conclusion which reflects the 
general idea of the discussion process. 
Since the initiation in 1990, the 
workshop has been held annually. The 
Indonesian-led workshop was considered to 
be successful in keeping the dispute from 
escalating further among claimant 
countries. In addition that the forum has 
successfully made informal discussions 
approach more familiar to the participants, 
the range of issues has also developed over 
the time as well. For example, after covering 
the basic fields of cooperation as theme of 
discussions for the first three workshops, 
the topic of discussion became more specific 
while the a number of aspects generated 
from the discussions were agreed upon and 
became implemented for cooperation 
(Satyawan, 2013). 
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Excerpts written by Indonesia’s 
senior diplomat Hasjim Djalal entailed 
points of basic principles of the workshop. 
While the guidelines put forward principles 
which reflects flexibility and inclusiveness, 
the guidelines also mentioned that 
managing potential conflicts is a long term 
process (Djalal, 2001), which then hints that 
it is a continuous, if not gradually 
improving process. Indeed, aside from the 
workshop the senior diplomat made efforts 
which were known today as the shuttle 
diplomacy. In 1994 Djalal made a series of 
visit to ASEAN member countries to 
introduce a proposal which was later 
known as the ‚doughnut proposal‛. Djalal 
proposed that the middle of South China 
Sea which consisted of islands should be 
‚negotiable for joint development‛. Despite 
the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Djalal, 
the proposal was rejected by ASEAN 
countries. 
In the mean time, Indonesian armed 
forces responded the dispute in a more 
conventional way. During the past decade 
of the ‘90s, ABRI have held military 
trainings in the waters of the Natuna 
Islands. This military training was a 
reaction to China’s unilateral action in 1993 
which included the Natuna’s waters into 
their official map (Republika Online, 1996). 
Dubbed as ‚loud diplomacy‛, in September 
1996 Indonesia deployed 40 combat 
aircrafts, 50 warships, and 19,500 armed 
personnel. While earlier in August, 
Indonesia and Malaysia had joint military 
exercise in the Island of Kalimantan. The 
exercises was conducted in the Natuna 
waters under the pretext of sea as a suitable 
place for military exercise in larger number 
and gives a specific vision of defense 
exercise in bordering waters. (IMN, 1996). 
But the military commander, Wiranto, gave 
a clear message to China that the exercise is 
conducted within Indonesia’s territorial 
waters and if China or any other countries 
considered that such activities might leave a 
different impression, it was entirely beyond 
control (IMN, 1996). This suggests that the 
Indonesian ABRI was fully aware with the 
‚inevitable consequences‛ generated from 
the large scale drill; however, they still 
conducted the activity and exercise 
authority over what they believe is theirs: 
Indonesia’s authority over the Natuna 
Islands and its adjacent waters. 
 
 
Indonesia’s Response to the South China 
Sea Dispute during the Post-Suharto’s 
Period 
 
BJ. Habibie’s Administration (1998-1999) 
 
With Suharto stepping down from 
Presidency, the plea for political reform was 
clear that the transitional government led 
by President B.J. Habibie named his cabinet 
as the Indonesian Development Reform 
Cabinet. Despite the lukewarm and 
pessimistic responses generated from the 
general public opinion, Habibie’s 
administration played its part to initialize 
the transitional period with bringing change 
to Indonesia’s political, social, and legal 
aspects as the precursor to Indonesia’s 
democratic state. The changes brought by 
Habibie gradually changed the face of 
Indonesia from a centralized quasi-
authoritarian state into a plethora of 
openness and freedom, which to an extent 
brought a massive hope for change that was 
culminated during the 1999 election. 
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For certain, the change brought 
positive impacts to Indonesians; rising 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency 
are to name a few from the positive changes 
brought by the ‘98 reform movement 
(Febrian, Setiadi & Suprapto, 1999). But 
changes also brought other unwanted 
excess from the other side of the coin; 
retroactive allegations of misconducts from 
past Suharto’s tenets, Indonesia’s fading 
prestige and the decline of authority to 
other countries particularly its ASEAN 
neighbors, increasing socio-political 
instabilities, domestic dissents and 
separatist movements were some of the 
problems Indonesia faced during the reform 
era. Indonesia sustained a major blow with 
the separation of Timor-Leste in 1999, 
which generated distrust among the 
military higher-ups to the civilian-led 
government, with the addition that a 
number the armed forces personnel were 
charged with the allegations of human 
rights abuse (O’Rourke, 2002). Another flaw 
to the administration led by Habibie was 
the less effort made toward the 
reconciliation of the ethnic Chinese who 
fled for safety after the riot broke out. An 
interview reflected how Habibie’s view to 
the minority group that controlled most of 
Indonesia’s economy as somehow 
‚dispensable‛ or replaceable by people who 
stayed in the country (Soebagjo, 2008), 
which might reflected how the leader’s 
inward looking orientation. 
Indonesia has always been taking an 
inward looking orientation when it comes 
to foreign policy during Suharto’s rule, and 
Habibie’s era was no exception. When the 
wave of reform struck the country in May 
1998, Indonesia faced multi-dimensional 
crises, with monetary and social crisis to 
name a few. Indonesia’s transitional 
government led by Habibie focused even 
more on domestic issues, most of which 
required active and direct response as the 
situation regularly fluctuated. Aside from 
established and regular day-to-day 
activities such as the Working Group on the 
SCS, this initial reform period dramatically 
reduced Indonesia’s active role in 
international relations (Mulyana, 2011). The 
country tried to allocate more resource and 
effort for the national recovery of the 
country, consequently disabling the 
government to give more attention to the 
SCS dispute. After more than three decades 
living under oppression of Suharto, 
Indonesia was anticipating for change and 
most of the energy and resources was 
allocated and concentrated for the 1999 
General Elections which marked the first 
post-New Order election. 
 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s Administration 
(1999-2001) 
 
The reform which gave rise to the 
demands for transparency, accountability, 
and good practice of politics sparked minor 
controversies regarding the results of the 
election which pitted two political party 
giants namely the established Golkar Party 
and the biggest challenger Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). 
Despite the legislative victory of the PDI-P, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri did not manage to 
secure the Presidential throne (KPU, 1999), 
after a grueling voting session in the House 
of Representatives, the Nadhlatul Ulama 
leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as 
the President, with Megawati as Vice 
President. 
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Wahid, who was popularly known 
with his nickname ‚Gus Dur‛, launched 
policies to recover Indonesia’s post-crisis-
torn reputation. Wahid traveled the world, 
one of his missions was to reach the Middle-
Eastern world, a world he was already 
familiar with but yet minimum in financial 
contribution to Indonesia, to gather funds 
for the republic’s development (Sutiono & 
Akbar, 2001). Aside from ASEAN, he 
strived to bring more Indonesian exposure 
to multilateral forums such as the 
Developing Countries (D-8) forum, the 
World Economic Forum, and World 
Summit for Social Development (Mulyana, 
2011). Although the efforts were carried out 
extensively, Gus Dur’s expectations and 
objectives of a number his foreign policies 
were never made clear. 
Domestically, Wahid made efforts to 
rehabilitate the victims of past regime 
‚misdemeanors‛ such as political prisoners 
and the racially discriminated when the 
President lifted the communist and Marxist 
ban from the national law, which then 
helped smoothed out the rocky path of 
ideological antagonism legacy of Suharto 
(Taufik, 2013). Moreover, this move helped 
rectify the historical misunderstandings 
between Indonesia and Communist China 
which turned sour after the suspension of 
diplomatic relations. Discussions and 
literatures related to the leftist ideas 
flourished, historical reviews and 
reinterpretations became a common theme 
in the literature and research, while the 
scholars and media alike are striving to find 
the missing links in history which can be 
utilized in invalidating the past in the name 
of uncovering the truth. 
As mentioned before, in addition to 
lifting the ideological ban Gus Dur helped 
Suharto’s political prisoners and Chinese-
Indonesians in rehabilitating their names 
and social integrity to the society. After 
decades of living under racial 
discrimination and political oppression by 
the New Order regime, Chinese-
Indonesians enjoy more freedom in socio-
political fields while their dominance of the 
national economy proven to be resilient, 
despite a number of notable individuals flee 
the country in reaction to the civil unrest 
targeting the Chinese-Indonesians and their 
assets during the May ’98 Riot (Soebagjo, 
2008). Nevertheless, Wahid’s efforts to 
integrate and rehabilitate the Chinese-
Indonesians into the society have proven to 
be a success, with most of Sino-phobia 
sentiments gradually faded and for the first 
time the Government of Indonesia 
acknowledged the Chinese racial identity as 
part of the national identity (Taufik, 2013). 
Over a few years after the reform, the 
relations of Indonesia – China improved 
significantly. China’s great economic rise by 
the end of the 20th century brought the 
country’s influence to Indonesia. Paired up 
with the reformed Indonesia which showed 
a friendlier face toward China, the two 
countries enjoyed a renewed relationship 
(Kyodo News International, 1999). Under 
the reform introduced by Wahid, China’s 
influence and culture has become more 
acceptable and accessible; Mandarin 
Chinese language gained larger popularity 
as the Chinese enterprises and investments 
grows steadily in Indonesia. China itself has 
become one of Indonesia’s biggest trading 
partners, (International Trade Center, 2015) 
with Chinese commodities flooded 
Indonesia’s domestic market, Indonesia was 
also aiming at China to sell its products as 
the country’s growth warranted the rise of 
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the middle and middle-upper class group 
which are known for their spending 
prowess. 
For some people, Wahid’s figure 
was considered to be a savior with his 
domestic and foreign policies (Cooper, 
2010), but his leadership was not without 
criticism. Despite his travels abroad which 
covered 90 countries, the endeavor were 
considered to be unnecessary while he was 
criticized for his negligence to domestic 
affairs (Mares, 2002). His unconventional 
demeanor received mixed receptions from 
the public, political allies, rivals, and 
adversaries alike. To his critics, his behavior 
and policies are considered to be from 
erratic to absurd as they tend to be 
disorganized, enigmatic, and 
incomprehensible for general public. His 
non-compromise and confrontative attitude 
turned his allies into adversaries who 
would later brought his downfall by 
impeachment. 
 
Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Administration 
(2001-2004) 
 
After Wahid was impeached by the 
House of Representatives (MPR) in 2001, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy has taken an even 
improved route with Megawati 
Sukarnoputri helming the country’s 
presidency. Started from a modest 
background in politics, Megawati was very 
inexperienced when it came to foreign 
affairs and its policies. Her grassroots-
oriented political party was focusing on 
domestic barebones issues such as 
regulating basic commodity price, inflation, 
and infrastructure. According to Sukma, 
Megawati’s lack of vision concerning 
foreign affairs was a blessing in disguise for 
Indonesia since she entrusted the 
diplomatic affairs to Hassan Wirajuda, a 
professional diplomat who succeeded Alwi 
Shihab as Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
2001. With Wirajuda commandeering the 
course of Indonesia’s diplomatic vessel, the 
country embarked for a larger role in 
international affairs. 
The Indonesian foreign minister 
introduced the term ‚Intermestic‛, a 
confluence between domestic and 
international aspects (Mulyana, 2011), 
which means the country wanted to 
maintain national interests through the 
seamless connectivity between its domestic 
issues and foreign policy. In a way, the new 
guidance to foreign policy could be 
understood to improve efficiency of the 
foreign policies’ goals in lieu to the essential 
domestic needs. Dissenters to the 
government may consider the new foreign 
policy jargon was created to minimize 
criticisms from the public which felt there 
was a disconnectivity between national 
interests and foreign policy under Wahid 
(Tribun News, 2013). This could be 
understood from a perspective of 
accountability of foreign policy, which 
might not bring results which were 
expected from the public. This could also 
mean that in case the public was less 
informed about the foreign policies, efforts 
could be made to help the public to obtain 
better understanding about the objective of 
Indonesian foreign policies, or what the 
country’s foreign policies could bring to the 
lives of ordinary citizens. 
In addition to the intermestic 
approach, Wirajuda also introduced ‚total 
diplomacy‛. Total diplomacy is an 
approach of diplomacy which incorporated 
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the various elements of the society to 
contribute to the success of diplomacy 
(Mulyana, 2011). In other words, total 
diplomacy is essentially an integrated 
concept of multi-track diplomacy, except 
instead of having the tracks reserved 
exclusively for the respective groups of 
individuals and/or institutions; the tracks 
are interchangeably utilized by the groups 
to interact which each other and ultimately 
contributing to the goals of the intermestic 
foreign policy. 
Indonesia’s role in international 
forums such as ASEAN was expanded 
under Wirajuda’s direction. During the 
Foreign Minister’s tenure, Indonesia helped 
to expand ASEAN to grow into a more 
close-knitted community, thus the concept 
of ASEAN Community was born after the 
Bali Concord II concluded (Moorthy & 
Benny, 2012). Indonesia’s foreign policy 
became inseparable to ASEAN, as the 
regional organization’s agenda was closely 
in conjunct with Indonesia’s foreign policy 
concerns that Indonesia’s leadership within 
ASEAN was considered to be substantial. 
The commitments to adopt the ASEAN 
Community concept has then lead to the 
member states affirmation for democratic 
values, which arguably led to democratic 
transformation in Myanmar (Emerson, 
2005). It was under Wirajuda that 
previously in 2002, ASEAN member 
countries successfully brought China 
together to agree on the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties (DOC) in South China 
Sea. According to Wirajuda, the DOC as the 
guideline to accommodate the peaceful 
resolution of the dispute is the fruit of the 
annual track-two informal workshop which 
has been conducted since 1990 (Dewan 
Pertimbangan Presiden). The content of the 
DOC itself contains points of reaffirmation 
of both the claimant and non-claimant states 
to settle the dispute through peaceful 
means, to not partake in any actions which 
could escalate the tension in the disputed 
area, while committing to further 
cooperation which was discussed during 
the informal workshops. Therefore, it could 
be said that during Megawati’s 
administration that Indonesia managed to 
give a significant improvement in terms of 
response to the SCS dispute since Suharto’s 
reign ended, as it managed to level-up into 
the track one multilateral diplomacy in the 
scale of ASEAN countries plus China. 
Regardless of the flaws during her 
tenure, Megawati was lauded as the 
progenitor of democracy in Indonesia as her 
administration facilitated the 
transformation of the state into the 
democratic Indonesia the world knows 
today. Despite assertion of her political 
interest to ensure her victory in the 
presidential election, Megawati’s 
administration passed the bill for the 
presidential general election in 2004, which 
symbolized the commitment for change and 
conformity to global norms. 
 
Democracy: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
Era (2004 – 2013) 
 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to 
Indonesia’s foreign policy during 
Megawati’s administration was to maintain 
Indonesia’s resilience to global issues such 
as terrorism, something which became the 
main intention since the country suffered 
the numerous terrorist attacks during 
Megawati’s presidency. Indonesia also 
gained the spotlight since the country is 
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home to the largest Muslim population in 
the world and the hotbed for alleged 
religious intolerances and terrorist training 
facilities. To this concern, Wirajuda 
subsequently played the diplomatic cards 
correctly by building the image of 
Indonesians Muslims as moderate among 
equal (Hughes 2010), while Indonesia’s 
counter-terrorism initiative gained 
commendation for its effectiveness in 
curbing terrorism and cooperativeness with 
their foreign counterparts. For Indonesia, 
after gaining post-reform momentum 
Megawati’s administration is the start when 
the country’s foreign policy pendulum 
began to swing. 
It was until 2004, the world began to 
see Indonesia’s leadership in a different 
light when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was 
elected as Indonesia’s sixth President. With 
his pre-election rising popularity, combined 
with the unexpected coalition with fractions 
of Golkar and other parties against 
Megawati’s PDI-P (Bulkin, 2013), 
Yudhoyono became the first directly elected 
President in Indonesia, cementing 
Indonesia’s prestige of ‚Democracy‛ which 
the country later capitalize on. Under this 
new banner, Indonesia steadily regains and 
even goes beyond the vestige of its former 
glory which was tarnished after the ’98 
Tragedy and the Post-9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Yudhoyono’s experience serving in Bosnia 
for Peace Keeping operations and studying 
abroad signified his familiarity with 
international issues. His close relation with 
foreign ministry official which was reflected 
on his book Harus Bisa! written by his Staff 
for International Affairs and Presidential 
Spokesperson, Dino Patti Djalal (then 
former Indonesian Ambassador to the US) 
indicated that he has been briefed on 
international issues. Yudhoyono himself 
was already familiar with the executive 
work environment as he was serving under 
the previous two administrations as 
Minister for Mines and Energy and 
Coordinating Minister for Political and 
Security, in which during his previous 
tenure should have gave him the insight 
about what worked well and what did not 
in the government, and Indeed, Yudhoyono 
might have entrusted his views on 
Indonesia’s expanded foreign policies based 
on such evaluation. 
In 2004 Yudhoyono picked Wirajuda 
to resume his post as the Foreign Minister. 
Wirajuda recommenced his previous work 
and expand Indonesia’s role further which 
remained grounded on strengthening the 
most on bilateral relations with stronger 
cooperation and partnerships, thus moving 
forward with the expansion and role of 
Indonesia in regional and international 
organizations (Mulyana, 2011). Indeed, 
Indonesia established economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) with Japan during Abe’s 
Administration in 2007, nurtured a 
comprehensive partnership with the US in 
2009, in which once again Indonesia gained 
the recognition as the world’s model for 
moderate Islam from Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton (Hughes, 2010). In 2007 
Wirajuda managed to have the ASEAN 
member countries to sign for the ASEAN 
Charter, the constitution for the regional 
organization which have been drafted since 
2005. The signing of the charter by the 
member states have effectively transformed 
the organization into a legally binding 
entity, a community, while enlist the 
commitment of the member states to pursue 
a mechanism for unresolved disputes. This 
means, through ASEAN mechanism, 
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Indonesia has moved a step further in 
creating a ‚tighter‛ environment for dispute 
settlement among ASEAN member 
countries which would constitute the 
signatories to abide to such mechanism 
when the time arise. However, it is not clear 
how the Charter can be implemented to 
resolve an inter-regional dispute such as the 
one in the SCS. 
Yudhoyono was re-elected to serve 
for a second term in 2009. Marty 
Natalegawa succeeded Wirajuda’s post as 
the foreign minister and further expand 
Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and Southeast 
Asia with his ‚Millions Friends Zero 
Enemies‛ concept, which is in conjunction 
to Yudhoyono’s new reinterpretation of 
Indonesia’s free and active doctrine. 
Indonesia according to Yudhoyono, has 
succeeded in passing the two reefs which 
pointed out that the country should take an 
even greater challenge, which is 
‚navigating the turbulent ocean‛. This new 
point of view hinted that Indonesia shall 
take on a larger role in the world, by 
actively establishing cooperation with other 
countries which affiliations and alliances in 
nature were rather constructed with 
fragmented-power relations which change 
dynamically as it was personified by a 
turbulent ocean (Mulyana, 2011). In 
addition, Natalegawa introduced the 
‚dynamic equilibrium‛ concept, which 
suggests that the possibility for a country to 
rise to power is larger. This concept is a 
reinterpretation of powers to countries like 
Indonesia, which has the means and 
opportunity to play a larger role-if not to 
obtain more power and influence. Should 
Natalegawa’s concept holds true, this 
means that the concept of power now has 
evolved into determined by factors such as 
roles, values, and identities, as opposed to 
conventional components of power. 
With this renewed view of foreign 
politics, Indonesia actively strived to 
maintain, if not enhance, its role as a bridge 
builder among worlds, stabilizer, and peace 
builder. In playing these roles, Yudhoyono’s 
administration utilized the existing 
elements of Indonesia, namely the Muslim 
population, the country’s role in ASEAN 
and other international organizations and 
forums. In addition to Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), Indonesia gained 
even a bigger role with its inclusion as the 
member of G-20, owing to the US 
nomination for membership. Sukma argued 
that Indonesia’s expanding role was 
something happened by default and not by 
design, or in other words the country’s 
active participation was not planned or not 
intended from the beginning, but rather a 
reaction or a response to a condition and 
opportunity (Sukma, 2013). To reinforce this 
argument, perhaps we can see that in terms 
of power Indonesia is rather weaker 
compared to its neighbors, but due to the 
development of the international politics, 
such as Obama’s administration and the 
SCS dispute, Indonesia managed to secure a 
larger role as it is today. 
The Yudhoyono’s administration 
saw an even more pro-active Indonesia in 
the efforts of resolving the disputes in 
Southeast Asia, particularly during 
Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2011. 
During its leadership in ASEAN, Indonesia 
successfully mediated the border dispute 
between Thailand and Cambodia which 
generated tensions among member states. 
To this cause, Indonesia sent observers to 
monitor the ceasefire, brought the 
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conflicting parties, and encouraged 
negotiations which ultimately diffused the 
dispute. 
In the same year, Indonesia was 
actively endorsing ASEAN member 
countries and China in implementing the 
DOC during the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (AMM) with China. Natalegawa as 
ASEAN Chairman urged the members to 
step-up the dispute resolution process by 
reaching a consensus on the guidelines for 
the implementations of the DOC (Thayer, 
2012). The meeting went successful with the 
consensus from the ASEAN countries and 
China was reached (Khalik & Nurhayati, 
2011), furthermore the talks resumed in 
Beijing in January 2012 where the senior 
officials from respective countries have 
agreed upon setting up four expert 
committees based on the DOC (Thayer, 
2012). Before the talks began in Beijing, 
there were discussions on setting up the 
Code of Conduct (COC) as the continuation 
of the DOC, and a number of officials have 
already worked on the COC (Thayer, 2012). 
Regardless, while China expressed its 
preference to stay clear from discussing the 
COC and maintained the original priority of 
the meeting which was to discuss the 
Guidelines of the DOC, the Philippines 
resumed producing and circulating the 
COC draft agenda among members. When 
ASEAN convened later that year for the 
annual Ministerial Meeting, the 
Chairmanship was already shifted to 
Cambodia, which pushed the agenda of 
having China in the ASEAN discussions; 
something which was deemed irregular 
considering China is not a member state to 
the Southeast Asian organization. The COC 
and China’s interference would later 
become the precursor to one of the biggest 
rift spikes within ASEAN members. 
It was later in July 2012 when the 2nd 
half of the AMM was held in Phnom Penh, 
when the Chair led by Cambodian Foreign 
Minister, Hor Nom Hong concluded that a 
joint communiqué could not be produced 
due to a lack of consensus from the 
members. Namhong concluded that the 
inclusion of the South China Sea paragraph 
in the communiqué will have the potential 
to escalate the tension since there were 
intentions from the member countries to be 
more specific with the naming of the 
disputed areas in question, whereas others 
expressed discontent with the direction the 
Chairman was leading. 
This turn of event drew a tense 
atmosphere among the member countries, 
particularly the Philippines and Cambodia 
which blame each other for the failure to 
reach a joint communiqué. Natalegawa, 
with the intention of preserving the unity of 
ASEAN, went for a shuttle diplomacy over 
a two-day period to Manila, Hanoi, 
Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Singapore. The 
tour started from the Philippines to discuss 
the six-points proposal with the country’s 
Foreign Minister Del Rosario. Once agreed, 
Natalegawa went to Vietnam, another 
ASEAN claimant country which has shown 
a desire to have a South China Sea 
paragraph in the joint communiqué which 
reflects the event occurred. From Hanoi, 
Natalegawa went to see his counterpart, 
Namhong, in Phnom Penh to discuss the 
six-point proposal which have been green 
lit by the previous two. Namhong agreed to 
Natalegawa’s proposal, and the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister entrusted it with his 
Cambodian counterpart when he left for his 
final destination of his tour to Singapore. 
18 
 
Indonesia’s Response in the South China Sea Disputes 
 
Later in July, Namhong on behalf of 
the Chair released the six point proposal as 
the ASEAN’s Six Principles of the South 
China Sea. The Six Principles is basically a 
substitution for the missing joint 
communiqué to address the SCS dispute, 
which exists to reaffirm the member states 
of the ASEAN and China to the existing 
principles of DOC with its implementations 
and guidelines, to the early conclusion of 
the Regional Code of Conduct (COC), 
respect to the international law with 
UNCLOS in particular, the commitment to 
self-restraint and non-use of force, and 
seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute. 
The Six Principles which was originally 
proposed by Indonesia successfully 
prevented the absence of consensus about 
the dispute resolution, which has the 
potential widening the rift among ASEAN 
member states. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to discuss 
how the post-Suharto regime’s approach to 
the SCS varies considerably from the 
Suharto era. The latter was characterized 
with an undisputed ruler to Indonesia’s 
political aspects during the New Order 
Regime, including the country’s foreign 
policy. Despite Suharto’s ‚ends justifies the 
means‛ principle to govern Indonesia for 
three long decades, the President’s power 
was not without constraints, as absolute as 
it may seem, Suharto’s control over 
everything in Indonesia was surpassed by 
forces beyond the geographical limit: 
economy.  
Indonesia’s response to SCS dispute 
during the New Order Era grew from 
maintaining over territorial integrity to 
actively accommodate peaceful talks 
between claimant countries might reflect 
Indonesia’s growing interests of the dispute 
itself or parties to the dispute. Indonesia’s 
relation with China is an example how the 
country’s dynamic of interests influenced its 
policies, notwithstanding the fact that there 
were contesting interests between 
Indonesia’s influential decision-making 
institutions, it was Suharto who gave the 
final says to everything. 
The post-Suharto era brought a 
different approach for Indonesia’s response 
to the SCS dispute. The red line which 
connects the four administrations would be 
identified as conditions that would 
determine Indonesia’s response. The first 
condition would be the domestic situation 
in Indonesia; as we can see the democratic 
Indonesia has more room for its foreign 
policy to maneuver due to a more stable 
domestic situation, while the earliest post-
Suharto domestic situation was marred 
with instabilities and crises, which require 
further attention and resources from the 
authorities; the second condition is the 
authority figure, in this case it would be the 
president as the highest executive power 
holder, and the foreign minister as the 
spearhead, or second-in-command of the 
foreign policy, after the president; the third 
condition would be the given role, as in to 
what extent does Indonesia had the capacity 
to execute its foreign policy from its given 
role in an international environment, such 
as ASEAN. 
One thing worth noting about 
Indonesia’s growing response to the SCS, it 
was steadily developing from a simpler 
honest broker role into an active bridge 
builder, and ultimately holds ASEAN’s 
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leadership in preserving inter-regional 
peace and stability. At a glimpse we might 
see that Indonesia made its best 
achievements when it was chairing ASEAN, 
but the events after 2012 AMM shows us 
that Indonesia can make a proper response 
to the SCS dispute regardless it holds the 
ASEAN chairmanship or not. 
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